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Abstract 
“The Rules” are found in a collaborative document (started in March 2010) that states principles for 
responsibility when a computer artifact is designed, developed and deployed into a sociotechnical system. 
At this writing, over 50 people from nine countries have signed onto The Rules (Ad Hoc Committee, 
2010). Unlike codes of ethics, The Rules are not tied to any organization, and computer users as well as 
computing professionals are invited to sign onto The Rules.  The emphasis in The Rules is that both users 
and professionals have responsibilities in the production and use of computing artifacts. In this paper, we 
use The Rules to examine issues of trust.
Introduction 
“The Rules” are found in a collaborative document (started in March 2010) that states principles for 
responsibility when a computer artifact is designed, developed and deployed into a sociotechnical system. 
At this writing, over 50 people (including the authors of this paper) from nine countries have signed onto 
The Rules (Ad Hoc Committee, 2010). Unlike codes of ethics, The Rules are not tied to any organization, 
and computer users as well as computing professionals are invited to sign onto The Rules.
Based on the theories of (Floridi and Sanders, 2001) and (Floridi, 2008), we have used levels of abstraction 
to examine ethical issues created by computing technology (see (Grodzinsky et al., 2008) and (Wolf et al., 
2011)).		In	those	analyses,	we	used	three	levels	of	abstraction:	LoA1,	the	users’	perspective;	LoA2,	the	
developers’	perspective;	and	LoAS,	the	perspective	of	society	at	large.	Our	analysis	of	quantum	computing	
and cloud computing, focused on computing professionals at LoA2, delivering functionality to users at 
LoA1 (Wolf et al., 2011). Our emphasis was on the professionals being worthy of the trust of users in that 
delivery.
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Our analysis of The Rules in this paper differs starkly from the earlier analyses of quantum and cloud 
computing. The Rules are not a computing paradigm; they are a paradigm for thinking about the impact of 
computing artifacts. The emphasis in The Rules is different from a technical computing project: both users 
and professionals are invited to acknowledge their responsibilities in the production and use of computing 
artifacts.	Yet	there	are	some	aspects	of	the	earlier	analyses,	especially	in	the	area	of	trust,	that	are	relevant	
to The Rules. In quantum computing, the implementers of quantum algorithms will likely not meet most 
of	the	users	of	those	algorithms,	and	although	we	don’t	anticipate	that	communications	are	likely	between	
individual users and the quantum developers, the trust relationship will be forged through the medium 
of the quantum algorithms.  Inherent in the design of cloud computing is the notion that the people who 
maintain the computing resources of the cloud are remote from the users of those resources. Humans are 
clearly crucial in the sociotechnical systems of cloud computing. But most of the relationships will be 
based on e-trust, not on face-to-face interactions.  Trust issues are more complex in these new computing 
paradigms, and it is our assertion that The Rules can inform a discussion of these issues.  
The	first	part	of	this	paper	presents	The	Rules.	The	Rules	document	currently	includes	five	rules	that	are	
intended to serve “as a normative guide for people who design, develop, deploy, evaluate or use computing 
artifacts.”	Next	we	briefly	examine	a	model	of	trust	and	the	relationship	between	The	Rules	and	society	
through the lens of trust. In other words, we will examine how computing artifacts and the sociotechnical 
system of which they are a part, serve as a medium through which trust relationships are played out.  Then, 
we shall examine each rule vis-à-vis the sociotechnical system and trust.  The existence and proliferation 
of computing artifacts and the growing sophistication of sociotechnical systems do not insulate users and 
developers from the need to trust and the obligation to be trustworthy. Instead, we are convinced that the 
power and complexity of these systems require us to be more dependent on trust relationships, not less. 
In the last section of the paper we illustrate this last statement by applying the Rules to the paradigms of 
quantum and cloud computing.
What Are The Rules?
“The Rules” began at a face-to-face meeting early in 2010, but many of the people who have now signed 
on to The Rules have not met each other face to face. The Rules has become a project explicitly based on 
Internet interactions. This aspect of The Rules is something that we often see in analyzing an ethical issue 
involving sociotechnical systems: there are people who are critical components in any such system, and 
often some of those people meet face to face. But sometimes, and increasingly often, after a computing 
artifact is “launched,” many (and sometimes most) of the ensuing interactions and relationships are 
computer-mediated.
The	five	rules	in	version	27	are:
Rule 1: The people who design, develop, or deploy a computing artifact are morally responsible for that 
artifact, and for the foreseeable effects of that artifact. This responsibility is shared with other people who 
design, develop, deploy or knowingly use the artifact as part of a sociotechnical system.
Rule 2: The shared responsibility of computing artifacts is not a zero-sum game. The responsibility of 
an individual is not reduced simply because more people become involved in designing, developing, 
deploying	 or	 using	 the	 artifact.	 	 Instead,	 a	 person’s	 responsibility	 includes	 being	 answerable	 for	 the	
behaviors	of	the	artifact	and	for	the	artifact’s	effects	after	deployment,	to	the	degree	to	which	these	effects	
are reasonably foreseeable by that person.
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Rule	3:	People	who	knowingly	use	a	particular	computing	artifact	are	morally	responsible	for	that	use.
Rule	4:	People	who	knowingly	design,	develop,	deploy,	or	use	a	computing	artifact	can	do	so	responsibly	
only when they make a reasonable effort to take into account the sociotechnical systems in which the 
artifact is embedded.
Rule	5:	People	who	design,	develop,	deploy,	promote,	or	evaluate	a	computing	artifact	should	not	explicitly	
or implicitly deceive users about the artifact or its foreseeable effects, or about the sociotechnical systems 
in which the artifact is embedded.
The Rules echo a theme that was developed in our earlier analyses: those at LoA2 owe a special duty of 
care to users at LoA1 (see (Grodzinsky et al. 2008) and (Wolf et al. 2011). Those who produce and sell 
computer artifacts are to act in a manner that is worthy of trust. But unlike the previous analyses, The 
Rules require that both computer professionals and users be trustworthy to society as a whole, reinforcing 
the inclusion of LoAS in the analysis of computer ethics.
A Model of Trust
We	will	use	the	following	principles	of	trust	developed	by	(Taddeo,	2008)	and	(Taddeo,	2009)	and	the	
model of trust in (Grodzinsky et al., 2011) (see the next section) as the basis for our discussion of trust 
relationships and The Rules.  
1. Trust is a relation between a (the trustor) and b (the trustee).  NOTE: a and  b can be human or 
an	artificial	agent	(AA).		A	relation	(certainly	in	the	mathematical	sense,	but	also	in	the	sociological	
sense) can involve both.
2. Trust is a decision by a to delegate to b some aspect of importance to a in achieving a goal. 
NOTE:	We	 rely	on	 the	notion	 that	 an	 artificial	 entity	a includes “decisions” (implemented by, 
for example, IF/THEN/ELSE statements), and we assume that a’s	 decisions	 are	 designed	 and	
implemented with the assumption that there is a high probability that b will behave as expected.
3. Trust involves risk; the less information the trustor a has about the trustee b, the higher the 
risk and the more trust is required.		NOTE:	this	is	true	for	both	artificial	and	human	entities.		In	
AAs,	we	expect	that	risk	and	trust	are	quantified	or	at	least	categorized	explicitly;	in	humans,	we	
do not expect that this proportionality is measured with mathematical precision.
4. The trustor a has the expectation of gain by trusting the trustee b.  NOTE: With respect to 
AAs,	“expectation	of	gain”	may	refer	to	the	expectation	of	the	AA’s	designer	in	moving	toward	
a	particular	goal,	or	it	may	refer	to	an	explicit	expression	in	the	source	code	that	identifies	this	
expected gain, or both. 
5. The trustee b may or may not be aware that trustor a trusts b.  NOTE: If b is human, 
circumstances may have prevented b from knowing that a trusts b.  The same is true if b is an 
AA, but there is also some possibility that an AA trustee b may not even be capable of “knowing” 
anything in the traditional human sense.
6. Positive outcomes when a trusts b encourage a to continue trusting b.  NOTE: If a is an AA, this 
cycle of trust → good outcome → more trust could be explicit in the design and implementation 
of the AA, or else it could be implicit in data relationships, as in a neural net.
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We contend that these principles are attributes that belong to any type of trust, be it e-trust or face-to-face 
(f2f)-trust.   
An Object Oriented Model of Trust
In a previous paper, we developed a model of trust based on object oriented software development principles 
(Grodzinsky	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 	The	 superclass	 of	 the	 trust	model	 is“XYZtrust”	which	 represents	what	 is	
common to eight subclasses of trust. In each of these eight subclasses, we can locate a set of possible trust 
relationships.		The	letters	X,	Y,	and	Z	in	XYZtrust	stand	for	important	aspects	of	the	trust	relationship.	X	
and	Y	classify	the	trustor	and	trustee	respectively	as	either	human	(H)	or	artificial	(A);	and	Z	specifies	if	
the	trust	is	established	either	face-to-face	(P,	or	“physical”)	or	electronic	(E).	These	three	binary	variables	
establish	 the	eight	possible	subclasses	of	XYZtrust,	and	each	subclass	 is	more	concrete	 than	 the	more	
abstract	superclass	XYZtrust.	Each	subclass	is	still	an	abstract	description	analogous	to	a	template,	and	
that template represents many possible instantiations of trust relationships. A list follows that enumerates 
the	eight	subclasses,	along	with	an	example	of	a	trust	relationship	that	fits	into	that	subclass.
HH-Ptrust:	traditional	notion	of	human,	“face-to-face”	trust;	most	discussions	of	“trust”	presuppose	this	
subclass
HH-Etrust: humans trust each other, but mediated exclusively by electronic means
HA-Ptrust:	human	trusts	a	physically	present	AA,	for	example,	a	robot	(no	electronic	mediation)
HA-Etrust:	human	trusts	an	artificial	entity	(for	example,	a	web	bot)	over	the	Internet
AH-Ptrust:	an	AA,	perhaps	a	robot,	trusts	a	physically	present	human
AH-Etrust: an AA, perhaps a web bot, trusts a human based on Internet interactions
AA-Ptrust:	an	AA	trusts	another	AA	in	a	physical	encounter;	because	this	is	Ptrust,	the	AAs	might,	for	
example, use sign language
AA-Etrust: an AA trusts another AA electronically, e.g., two web bots communicate via the Internet
Each	instance	of	an	XYZtrust	subclass	is	either	all	P	or	all	E.	Thus	if	two	particular	humans,	participate	in	
HH-Etrust	and	also	participate	in	HH-Ptrust,	then	we	intend	that	these	instances	of	trust	be	modeled	with	
two	separate	instantiations,	one	in	HH-Etrust	and	the	other	in	HH-Ptrust.
HHP HHE
	HAP  HAE
AHP AHE
AAP AAE
Table 1: Eight distinct subclasses of XYZ Trust
Table	1	lists	the	subclasses	of	XYZtrust.	In	this	arrangement,	the	first	column	requires	physical	proximity,	
and the second column is strictly electronic.  In this paper, our analysis of The Rules focuses on the types 
of	trust	relationships	found	in	the	first	row.	Although	the	other	rows	(each	of	which	involves	at	least	one	
AA) have relevance to computing professionals (see Grodzinsky, et al, 2011), the Rules emphasize the 
human relationships at stake in sociotechnical systems that involve computing.
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The Rules, Trust and Society
The	Rules	are	an	attempt	to	change	people’s	minds	about	moral	responsibility	for	computing	artifacts.	
The people who have signed The Rules thus far are people aware of the computing details known 
by developers. However, if The Rules are to have a wider impact, that impact will be observable at 
LoAS. Whenever computing professionals take seriously their collective and individual responsibilities 
for computing artifacts, they act in ways that enhance public trust in computing. Insofar as The Rules 
successfully encourage computing professionals to act this way; The Rules will enhance public trust. 
But The Rules can also be seen as a challenge to computing professionals, a call to account for the artifacts 
they design, develop and deploy. Seen in this way, The Rules could be interpreted by some as a reason 
for society as a whole to trust computing professionals less, especially if computing professionals resist 
acknowledging the responsibilities outlined in The Rules. The extent to which The Rules have either 
of these effects on society (or any discernible effect at all) can best be examined (either theoretically or 
empirically) at LoAS.
Although computer users may often act as if they are trusting machines, The Rules insist that the people 
who design, develop and deploy these machines are directly responsible for the machines and their effects. 
In addition, The Rules state that people who use these machines are responsible for how they are used. We 
can restate that emphasis in the following way: those who design, develop and deploy computing artifacts 
are placed in a relationship of trust with those who use the artifacts. The computing artifacts and the 
sociotechnical system that the artifacts are embedded in act as a medium through which a trust relationship 
is played out between people.
The Rules also state that users are responsible for the consequences of their use of computing artifacts. 
In this relationship, users are in a trust relationship with people who are affected (or potentially affected) 
by the use of a computing artifact (the “penumbra”). Again, the computing artifact and the sociotechnical 
system of which it is a part serve as a medium through which trust relationships are played out among 
people.
Rule 1: The Major Players in Computing Trust
Rule	 1	 identifies	 two	 groups	 of	 people:	 those	 who	 create	 a	 computing	 artifact	 and	 those	 who	 use	 a	
computing artifact in a sociotechnical system: the creators of the artifact (designers and developers) and 
the users (who deploy the artifact).  Thus, there are three trust relationships that must be considered: trust 
among the designers and developers themselves; trust between users and creators; and trust between users 
and the penumbra.  Both the group and individuals in the group that create computing artifacts must take 
on moral responsibility for the artifact.  Individuals must trust that other team members in the group are 
willing to accept the moral responsibility that Rule 1 calls for.  That is, there is an accepted goal among the 
creators of the artifact to examine the effects of that artifact on society and to perform their functions with 
the appropriate standard of care. This is a familiar theme in professional ethics and addresses the problem 
of “many hands” that Helen Nissenbaum cites as a problem of computing accountability (Nissenbaum, 
2007).
In the second trust relationship, between the users and the creators of the artifact, the users who trust 
developers	will	buy	their	products	and	use	them	with	confidence.		
In the third relationship, it is less essential that those who use a particular artifact in a particular sociotechnical 
system develop any sort of trust with those in the penumbra who use that particular artifact in the same or 
any other sociotechnical system.  Nor is there any strong need for the development of trust among people 
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employing different computing artifacts in the same sociotechnical system.  More essential is the response 
of the users and creators when it is evident at LoAS that the artifact is causing an unanticipated problem.
Rule 2: Many Hands and Trust
Rule 2 emphasizes the need for a high degree of trust between users of a computing artifact and the 
creators of a computing artifact.  It is intuitive that the users of a computing artifact will need to trust 
the	creators	of	the	artifact.		The	users	trust	that	the	artifact	meets	its	specification.		That	is,	the	artifact	
should do what it is supposed to do, and using the artifact in its intended way does not result in unintended 
negative consequences.  Ironically, most software developers, both proprietary and free and open source 
developers, disclaim all warranties for software, even when the software is used for its intended purpose.
But	this	user	→	creator	trust	has	an	inverse.		Creators	also	have	trust	issues	with	their	users	in	addition	to	
the ones cited in Rule 1. For example, developers trust (or at least hope) that users will honor the relevant 
licensing agreements. (Notice that this is true for both proprietary software and for Free and Open Source 
software.) 
Furthermore, developers need to trust that users will not use the computer artifact in bizarre, unanticipated 
ways. With the moral responsibility that Rule 1 brings to bear on the artifact creators for the foreseeable 
effects of the use of the artifact, the developers need to trust that users will not use the artifact in some 
unforeseeable, negative or potentially dangerous way.  Such use may bring needless risk to society.  Honest 
statements by the creators of an artifact regarding the intended use of the artifact build should be honored 
by users to further the trust that both groups have in each other.  A user, who intends to use an artifact for 
an unintended purpose, ought to seek advice from its creator regarding the new, unanticipated use, in order 
to ascertain whether the intended use is consistent with the moral responsibilities outlined by The Rules.
One concern regarding using a computing artifact for an unintended purpose is the damage such use might 
bring to the fabric of trust that has been built between computing artifact developers and society.  An 
artifact user bears the responsibility of weighing the potential damage any unintended use of the artifact 
may bring to this important trust relationship.
Rule 3: Users, Trust, and Society
Rule 3 mitigates some of the concerns regarding trust and the unintended use of a computing artifact. 
However, even though according to The Rules, the knowing user of the computing artifact bears moral 
responsibility, we are still concerned about the damage to the developer/society trust relationship such use 
would bring. Users also have a wider responsibility towards society. The power of a computing artifact 
brings with it the responsibility to use that power in a way that respects other people. Thus, users of a 
computing artifact must act in a way that is trustworthy with respect to society; this trustworthiness should 
be observable at LoAS.
Rule 4:  Sociotechnical Systems and Trust
Computer artifacts are “connections” among people; the emphasis in Rule 4 widens this focus. 
Sociotechnical systems include computing artifacts, but also encompass customs, laws, regulations, 
cultural norms, infrastructure, and any other factors that make the development and use of the artifacts 
possible. But developers and users are responsible for their choices to participate in these sociotechnical 
systems.	Society	expects	these	systems	to	benefit	society,	and	trusts	both	computing	professionals,	as	well	
as other people who participate in these systems, to develop and use them responsibly.  
SIGCAS Computers and Society  |  December 2012  |  Vol. 42  |  No. 2 21
Joseph	Weizenbaum	(1984)	and	Bill	Joy	(2000)	both	argued	that	developers	have	a	choice	in	the	kinds	of	
computer science research to undertake and the kinds of artifacts to develop.  They both suggest that there 
may be certain areas of research that we should be careful exploring, or at least, we should be honest about 
the limitations of the artifact because often we cannot predict the effects of the artifact on society. Our 
increasing societal reliance on socio-technical systems, the enormous reach and impact of these systems, 
and	 the	 accelerating	 rate	 of	 changes	 in	 these	 systems,	make	 this	 choice	 a	 difficult	 one	 for	 computing	
professionals.	The	difficulty	does	not	absolve	computing	professionals	from	their	responsibility	to	make	
their choices deliberately and wisely.
Rule 5:  Truth-Telling and Trust
Issac	Asimov	 is	 given	 credit	 for	 an	 interesting	 quote	 about	 humans	 and	 computing	 artifacts:	 “Part	 of	
the inhumanity of the computer is that, once it is competently programmed and working smoothly, it is 
completely honest.” (Asimov)   
Trust	and	honesty	are	deeply	linked.	Rule	5’s	statements	about	not	deceiving	others	go	a	long	way	toward	
building trust.  As honest statements about computing artifacts are made, and it becomes clear that the 
statements are true when the artifacts are deployed (observed at LoAS), society builds trust in the claims 
of artifact creators. Overstatements or a lack of candor about the weaknesses or dangers of particular 
artifacts and sociotechnical systems will erode that trust.  For example, when an Intel processing chip had 
a hardware error that occurred in certain kinds of division, the company tried to stonewall and said that it 
had	an	infinitesimal	probability	of	occurring,	and	it	would	be	expensive	to	fix	this	error.	Under	pressure	
from engineers who feared that these chips would not be reliable—imagine them in an avionics system 
where deaths could occur—Intel eventually relented. Trust in the company was restored when Intel owned 
up to the error, redid the masks and issued substitute chips at no cost to the users.  
While we acknowledge that no software is error free, we observe a lack of trust in companies such as 
Apple	or	Microsoft	at	LoAS	when	users	 refuse	 to	buy	first	generation	products.	 	Consumers	continue	
to	buy	products	after	software	failures,	but	this	is	often	seen	as	a	necessary	evil,	not	a	reflection	of	trust.	
Lawsuits	about	software	failures	reflect	this	lack	of	trust.	(For	example,	see	(Weier,	2008),	(King,	2010),	
and (Vijayan,  2010).)
WikiLeaks: A Case Study of Electronic Trust (and Distrust)
In	2010,	the	website	WikiLeaks	released	numerous	documents	classified	as	secret	to	by	the	United	States	
government.		As	the	ramifications	of	these	documents	became	apparent,	numerous	financial	companies	
broke their ties with WikiLeaks, depriving it of its main source of funding.  In retaliation, WikiLeaks 
supporters posted distributed denial of service (DDoS) software on Facebook and encouraged people to 
download that software and install it on their computers.  Once installed, the originators of the software 
used	those	computers	to	send	disruptive	messages	to	retaliate	against	the	financial	institution’s	computers,	
making their websites almost completely inaccessible by anyone intending to conduct business with the 
financial	institutions.
There are numerous entities that come into consideration in this story including WikiLeaks, the developers 
of the DDoS software, the developers of Facebook, the sociotechnical system created by Facebook, those 
who	installed	the	DDoS	software	on	their	computers,	the	users	of	the	financial	institutions	websites,	and	
the	financial	institutions	themselves.		Each	of	these	entities	is	part	of	some	trust	relationship	and	serves	to	
illuminate the points we have made.
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Prior	to	the	WikiLeaks	incident,	DDoS	developers	had	done	much	to	damage	the	trust	between	software	
developers	 and	 users	 of	 software.	 	 DDoS	 software	 was	 typically	 installed	 on	 a	 “user’s”	 computer	
without	the	user’s	knowledge	and	then	used	by	the	developer	to	cause	harm	to	a	third	party.		This	sort	of	
misappropriation	of	a	user’s	computer	led	to	mistrust	of	the	developer	of	the	operating	system.		Rule	3	is	
clear about laying responsibility for the damage at the feet of those who deployed the DDoS since the user 
rarely	knows	about	the	DDoS	software	existing	on	the	user’s	computer.
In the WikiLeaks incident, DDoS developers provided like-minded people the opportunity to participate in 
an apparent act of civil disobedience.  In this context, however, users of the DDoS software chose to install 
the software on their computers.  Rule 3 in this case, applies to the users, since they knowingly installed 
the software and then knowingly relinquished control of it to those who launched the software.  In this 
context, the user trusts the developer to accomplish a goal for the user.  Thus, the same sort of software, 
depending on the sociotechnical context, facilitates and erodes trust between developers and users.
When considered at the LoAS, both uses of DDoS do little to facilitate trust between software developers 
and	society.		The	users	of	the	DDoS	software	have	damaged	the	ability	of	people	to	access	their	financial	
information	at	the	targeted	financial	institutions.		General	trust	in	software	developers	and	the	systems	they	
have	developed	is	eroded.		Further,	since	many	users	of	financial	institution’s	websites	may	not	understand	
that	the	DDoS	is	taking	place,	they	may	begin	to	lose	trust	in	the	financial	institutions	themselves.				Another	
concern surrounding this incident is that unlike traditional acts of civil disobedience, the participants in the 
DdoS—both those who allowed their computers to be used and those who orchestrated the attack—did 
little to make their identities known.
What If We Don’t Trust?  Applying The Rules to Cloud and 
Quantum Computing
We asserted in our introduction that the existence and proliferation of computing artifacts and the growing 
sophistication of sociotechnical systems do not somehow insulate us against the need to trust and the 
obligation to be trustworthy. Instead, we are convinced that the power and complexity of these systems 
require us to be more dependent on trust relationships, not less.  This becomes clear when we consider 
trust in new and emerging technologies.  We analyze The Rules and trust as they apply to the relatively 
new	cloud	computing	and	then	to	the	emerging	field	of	quantum	computing.
Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is a term that encompasses many different technologies and sociotechnical systems. 
However, most of these systems feature computing resources (both hardware and software) that are 
remote from the users of the resources. Users access these resources via Internet connections and rely on 
the providers of the resources to make the resources accessible and secure.
In most cases, the users and the providers of cloud computing will not physically meet. The relationships 
between users and providers are, then, of the electronically mediated type described above. The emphasis 
in The Rules on responsibility and honesty seem particularly appropriate to these HHE relationships. First, 
cloud computing users must trust providers to take care of their data and software; this is fundamental 
to	the	implicit	social	contract	of	cloud	computing.	Providers	who	are	careless	or	cynically	indifferent	to	
issues of accessibility and security are clearly not living up to the responsibilities described in The Rules.
Similarly, if concerns about the security and accessibility (both trust issues) discourage some from 
exploiting cloud computing, and if cloud computing gives its users a competitive advantage (as its 
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advocates claim), then these trust issues will have economic repercussions. If those who trust and commit 
to cloud computing are disappointed by a serious breach of security or a lack of accessibility at an urgent 
moment, then their trust will have been betrayed. 
The Rules suggest another, perhaps less obvious, responsibility relevant to cloud computing: users of cloud 
computing should not exploit computing resources from the cloud to do harm to others. For example, it 
would be a clear violation of The Rules for someone to sign up for a particular cloud computing service, 
and then use that access to steal data or disrupt the resources for other customers of that service. Both 
providers and users are called to account by The Rules for responsible behavior.
Quantum Computing
Quantum	computing	is	a	relatively	new	field.		The	fundamental	nature	of	quantum	computation	has	been	
known for over thirty years, yet physicists are still trying to develop quantum computers that are of any 
significant	 size.	 	One	 significant	difference	between	quantum	computers	 and	digital	 computers	 is	 that	
quantum computers are probabilistic in nature.  That is, there are times that the output is not a correct 
solution to the problem for the given inputs.  Another thing that is known about quantum computers is that 
a	quantum	computer	of	a	given	size	will	be	significantly	more	powerful	than	digital	computers	of	the	same	
size.  It is important to note that there are small quantum computers available in the marketplace for highly 
specialized applications.  Trust and The Rules will play an important role as bigger quantum computers are 
developed and they become commercially available.
Rule 1 ascribes moral responsibility to the creators of quantum computers for their foreseeable effects. 
Given the potential power of this technology, quantum developers would be well-served by developing 
trust among potential users and in society regarding these artifacts.  As a nascent technology, developers 
will have an economic interest in developing a user base.  That user base needs to trust the claims of 
the developers and society needs to trust that developers and users of quantum computers will bear 
responsibility for their general use.  Computer and information ethicists have a role to play here.  We can 
help analyze the impact that this new technology might have.  
We	 have	 begun	 this	 process	 for	 quantum	 computation	 (Wolf	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	We	 identified	 a	 potential	
problem	with	secure	communication	when	there	are	those	with	access	to	quantum	computers.		Today’s	
most common cryptographic methodologies are subject to attack by quantum computation. Those with 
quantum computers will be in a position to decode any encrypted message they capture.  The Rules 
suggest that quantum developers are morally responsible for this situation and the impact it will have on 
the social and economic systems of the world.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed The Rules and the role trust plays among computing professionals, users and 
society as a whole.  We explored cloud computing and quantum computing as two examples of computing 
paradigms in which trust and responsibility are key.  This work on emerging computing paradigms builds 
on earlier work by Weckert and Moor who examined how best to proceed in nanotechnology research when 
there might be adverse effects at LoAS.  Using the “precautionary principle” (Weckert and Moor, 2004: 
12) assert: “If some action has a possibility of causing harm, then that action should not be undertaken 
or some measure should be put in its place to minimize or eliminate the potential harms.”  Their analysis 
focuses primarily on the relationship of LoA2 and LoAS and examines the various types of harms and 
risks of artifacts that could cause adverse effects at LoAS.  Their claim about the necessity of weighing 
benefits	 and	harms	 is	 supported	by	The	Rules.	 In	 addition,	 using	models	 such	 as	 those	developed	by	
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(Floridi, 2008) and (Grodzinsky et al., 2008)  helps computing professionals, users, and society (LoA2, 
LoA1 and LoAS) better understand issues of responsibility, risk and trust for particular computing artifacts 
and sociotechnical systems. 
Concerns such as those expressed by Weckert, Moor, Joy and Weizenbaum call into question the kinds of 
research or development that should be pursued and at what cost.  The Rules offer a way of assessing risks 
so that if an artifact is a large risk for serious harm, development of that artifact can be curtailed or at least 
more carefully managed.  Although The Rules echo the sentiments of computer scientists and philosophers 
that the burden of proof that an artifact is safe lies with the developer and is present at LoA2, The Rules 
also advocate that all people involved with computing artifacts act in a manner that is trustworthy and 
responsible.	If	people	don’t	act	responsibly	as	they	produce,	promote	and	use	computing	artifacts,	then	
The Rules suggest that society should neither trust those people nor their artifacts. We contend that this is 
true for all computing artifacts and for the sociotechnical systems in which they are embedded.
We are convinced that this need for 
trustworthiness with respect to computing 
artifacts and sociotechnical systems will be 
visible at LoAS. Our future research plans 
include examining empirical evidence at 
LoAS that demonstrates the importance of 
trustworthiness from participants at LoA1 
and LoA2.
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